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VIEWS ON LEGAL EDUCATION:
AN EXCHANGE
RICHARD

A. EPSTEIN & DUNCAN KENNEDY

PROFESSOR EPSTEIN: In response to Professor Kennedy, let
me just try to present a couple of points where I think there
might be some contention. I think the most controversial part
of Professor Kennedy's presentation is the pay-off at the end,
where a disinterested positive inquiry somehow turns into a
general condemnation of greed and self-interest. Or should I
say, it becomes a condemnation of the greed and self-interest
of the privileged. This seems to be taking a powerful page from
the book of one of my favorite political philosophers, Thomas
Hobbes.
I ought to spell out a basic premise here that I neglected to
state earlier: One of the reasons why political institutions turn
out to be so enormously intractable is that, just as plants never
cease to move toward the sunlight, so it is that individuals taken
in the aggregate never cease to maximize their self-interest.
When you start to deal with various kinds of legal arrangements, you find that many people are astonishingly indifferent
between producing something of value to themselves and taking it from somebody else. Yet the social consequences of the
two moves are rather different; one is a positive sum game and
the other turns out to be a negative sum game. What one wants
to do if one wants to be a conservative - and I guess it's fair
enough to call me a conservative - is to recognize that once
you start to talk about greed, you then have to figure out what
practices constitute the greediness that you can tolerate and
what practices constitute the greediness that you cannot tolerate. That is, attacking people's actions solely on the grounds
that they are motivated by self-interest is basically to condemn
us all to a life of utter immobility, given what we know about
ourselves and about our fellow man.
Starting with that premise, my radical side - remember I
said I had a radical side - makes a right-wing critique of modern institutions, a critique which insists upon a distinction between markets on the one hand and mercantilism on the other
hand. Both of these practices have travelled under conservative
banners because both of them from time to time have been
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supported by businessmen. But mercantilism tends to be supported by those that are in positions of power and wealth and
are trying to pull up the ladder after they have climbed it, to
take the bridge down once they have safely crossed the river.
The system of markets is supported by those who wish to climb
that ladder or cross that river. People on both sides will likely
advance their arguments from base self-interest. But I think we
have a set of intellectual and analytical tools which allow us to
say that people that want to keep ladders and bridges in operation are generally preferred to those people who wish to erect
protective walls around themselves. So while I find a certain
very powerful incoherence in many American institutions, I
also find a fairly consistent and powerful theory, based upon
some mix of liberty and utility. I would fight that one very hard.
I am no believer in any massive inequality of bargaining power.
What I would be prepared to do in a more extended debate
any time, any place, any way - is to argue that the sources
of the corruption lie in institutional arrangements rather than
in individual greed, and that most of the institutional arrangements which have fostered corruption have been the product of
modern high-minded liberal democratic reform. What we really
have to do is to find a way, either through constitutional means
or through intellectual means or through common law means,
to try and get back to a situation which many people would
mistakenly deplore, the high point of laissez-faire. One of the
the worst things that you can do when you talk about Herbert
Spencer is to apologize for invoking his name. The man had far
more institutional sense than Oliver Wendell Holmes, even if
the latter was far better at epigrams than the former.
On balance, I think Professor Kennedy's long-term critique
is right. But once you understand his program, most of the proposals that he has pushed forward turn out to be one of two
sorts. They either turn out to be silly or authoritarian, and I'm
afraid of both.
I will end with a little story which my father told me because
he was once a socialist. (It lasted for ten minutes. He became a
doctor.) I think it captures much of the difference between us,
and it goes something like this. Two fellows were standing on a
bus, and they were both very active in the movement to overthrow the government. The first comrade says to the second,
"Comrade, come the revolution, we'll all have strawberries."
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(Note the appeal to implicit wealth maximization.) And the second comrade says, "But I don't like strawberries." (Note the
appeal to individual choice.) The first comrade comes back with
the punch line: "Come the revolution, you'll like strawberries."
PROFESSOR KENNEDY: I guess I would like to say something
briefly. Offered a chance to describe one of my proposals by its
denunciation as either silly or authoritarian, I really cannot
resist.
Before I present my most basic proposal for legal education,
I should say that it has nothing to do with any program of the
critical legal studies movement. In fact, most of the people in
the movement regard this proposal as, I guess, either silly or
authoritarian. This shows once again the difficulty of distinguishing yourself from the "bad associations" invoked by those
attempting to tar you.
I am a very strong believer in the idea of voluntary work
place autonomous self-activity, which I think is just another way
of expressing what Professor Epstein just described. Like him, I
am a passionate believer in people voluntarily ordering and reordering their own destinies on a small scale, taking power in
the places where they live, and making voluntary arrangements
which then can resist the attempts of larger structures to interfere and control them.
Given my belief in that, I think the hierarchical ordering of
'the American legal education system is not socially useful when
looked at from an instrumental point of view. It does not maximize wealth and it is not conducive to the maximization of the
value of resources. In fact, quite the contrary. We have this
enormously hierarchical ordering of schools in which the
schools at the top of the hierarchy have the most money, the
supposedly best trained faculty, and the students who get the
best test scores. Many kinds ofjustification are offered for this.
I think they all fall before an Epstein internal critique. The minute you begin to look at the way people justify the hierarchy, it
becomes clear that you just can not do it. You do not have to
arrange things that way.
Along with the liberty of groups to reorder themselves, I am
in favor of the substantive ideals of equality and fraternity.
These ideals suggest voluntarily scrambling the hierarchy of
law schools; law teachers and law students voluntarily scram-
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bling so that in fact people are assigned within regional
preferences.
PROFESSOR EPSTEIN: Whoops!
PROFESSOR KENNEDY: Assigned.

.

.voluntarily. This is to

say that the group voluntarily devises a system of assignment.
There is nothing self-contradictory about the idea of a group
deciding to govern some of its own activities by a principle of
random assignment. That happens within actual groups quite
often. People decide to get together and they all agree: "Let's
do it this way rather than doing it that way." The democratic
decision rule will vary from group to group. It might be majority rule, it might be the corporation controls everything at
Harvard, it might be the board of trustees, it might be a 2/3
majority of the faculty. Whatever the democratic decision rule
that you consider to be legitimate is, the argument is that we,
acting as a democratically empowered group to make voluntary
arrangements, should reorder the system and level the
hierarchy.
Now people often say: "Well don't you realize, Duncan, that
hierarchy is absolutely inevitable and it's a consequence of
'human nature'?"' Hierarchy would re-emerge, and then this
same democratic majority ought to decide to rescramble the
system.
This is a proposal which is often misinterpreted as authoritarian because the group has decided what it wants to do - voluntarily. It is also sometimes interpreted as silly on the grounds
that it could not possibly happen. But it does not seem to be
true that it's either "authoritarian or silly." It is an example of
the libertarian impulse at work.
PROFESSOR EPSTEIN: Well, libertarians, I think, would disagree with it. I certainly would. I mean there are a couple of
moves in this dance that seem to leave the partners standing
alone on the floor. We are told that we want it to be done by
free and voluntary arrangement, and everybody is thinking:
"Ah hah! Now we have a situation of unanimous consent." And
1. Incidentally, it seems to me that "human nature" is something about which you
conservatives have an unjustified sense of deep knowledge. You tend to emphasize
how little can be known; that is implicit in everything you say about reform, for example. If you were as skeptical about your knowledge of human nature as you are about
the consequences of reform, I think you would appeal to it less often as a sort of "killer
argument" that settles everything. Maybe, maybe not.
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so what happens is that all agree to put themselves in some
kind of a common pool and allow somebody else to allocate.
Well, my first advice, Duncan, is include me out. You want to
have this kind of a system; I want to resign. And now it turns
out you have said:"Well, once you signed on for this contract,
you can not retreat." What you have done is take from everyone the power to control his own destiny. You have at least
abolished the idea of contracts at will on the other side. The
reason everyone fears the dynamic of collective choice is that, if
left untrammeled, the passions of some work against the liberty
of others. Yet your system of group control does not even begin to account for handling the conundrums of collective
choice. Until any kind of system of reform tells you how to respond to abuses of voting power, you are not talking about liberty. The key point is that I want to be the guy who makes the
assignments. I know where I can send you and I know where I
can send me, and I do not want to teach at Nome Law School in
my underpants.
The present system is far better. I would much rather work
out an arrangement with my dean whereby if he wants to pay
me enough, I will stay. The point is, I am not at all upset about
being greedy because I am prepared to give somebody value
-forwhat I get. I am not prepared to turn my life over to a committee which can then do the kinds of things which I regard as
utterly intolerable, things that are, and I will say the two words
again, silly and authoritarian. What is so interesting and so distressing is that Professor Kennedy told us ten minutes ago that
freedom and wealth maximization were radically incoherent.
Now we are told that once you understand these criteria, they
do not seem to apply to the case in hand, which is legal education. Well, of course they apply and both of them point the
same way: if you believe in freedom, you do not believe in coercion; if you believe in wealth maximization, you do not take
people from the place where they think their marginal product
is highest and put them into an environment which they regard
as hostile unless you can identify an externality, of which here
there is none. This is not a case in which one goes into class
and commits a tort of pollution. I do not want to have somebody telling me where it is he is going to lead me by the nose
even if he is a nice guy. Once it starts, it doesn't stop.
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PROFESSOR KENNEDY: Who is going to have the last word
here?
PROFESSOR EPSTEIN: You will - with my pleasure. Not the
best word, but the last.
PROFESSOR KENNEDY: I guess what I hear you offering is
actually about eight reasons why this is a bad idea. They came
so fast it is hard to sort them out. But I honestly do not think
you would find yourself defending any of them very seriously if
we were to pause and go through them one by one.
First of all, I do not think you would want to argue that you
can understand the existing system of legal education as just
the product of free choice. As a legal theorist, you yourself are
always interested in and preoccupied with the structuring role
of collective choice mechanisms in the creation of an institutional pattern. In addition, you are always very preoccupied
with figuring out what the consequences of a particular set of
institutional decisions are. You would ask, for example, whose
property rights are protected by the state, what invasions those
righti protect the property owner from, and what the consequences of that system are for the character of the social life.
Yet your initial reaction is that there is a contrast between the
existing system, which you see as free, and the system I am proposing, which you see as based on authoritarianism or force. It
seems to me that this is inconsistent with everything you have
ever written, all of which is preoccupied with the necessity of
understanding the role of, the backing up of, particular entitlements. Like collective choice and force.
So basically what we are talking about here is a classic reordering. We are not going from no order to an order. But then
you suggest that there is no conceivable collective choice mechanism which you would accept as a legitimate root for getting
from where we are to where I am suggesting we ought to go.
You can not possibly mean that. I am perfectly willing to discuss collective choice mechanisms. In fact, you probably have
some conceptions of which ones you more or less accept. And
you are probably willing to make other arguments, such as that
you will be sent to Nome to teach in your underpants, to justify
one particular collective choice mechanism rather than another. I am happy to engage in that discussion. But the larger
argument is that once we decide what the proper choice mechanism is, then the question becomes what one is going to get up
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and say, so to speak, in the proverbial oligarchic smoke-filled
room.
PROFESSOR EPSTEIN: No, I do not want to be there. I said
include me out.
PROFESSOR KENNEDY: You say you do not want to be involved in the collective choice at all, but you do! You clearly
love involvement in collective choice mechanisms.
PROFESSOR EPSTEIN: Your collective choice mechanism. I
do not want to be involved in your collective choice mechanism.
PROFESSOR KENNEDY: But you are, inevitably!
PROFESSOR EPSTEIN: No, I am not! We are of the same
country. It is one thing to be, thank God, citizens of the same
country, but we are not citizens of the same law school and
that is the way I want to keep it. If you want to organize your
shop that way, that is fine.
PROFESSOR KENNEDY: This is what I have been waiting for
you to say.
PROFESSOR EPSTEIN: Of course there are imperfections in
the way in which things have gone on, but that is hardly a justification for creating more and worse imperfections than we
have ever had under the present system.
PROFESSOR KENNEDY: Well, this seems to be the kind of
area in which we might join issues as long as we are not at this
very Olympian domain.
PROFESSOR EPSTEIN: There is nothing Olympian about
tackling this problem. It is the instincts of base survival that
move me to say what I say. The hell with this abstraction.
PROFESSOR KENNEDY: If I may have the last word, in my
image of this, I would certainly welcome you after the scrambling had taken place. I would love to be on the same law
school faculty as you. I think as a member of the same collective
choice process, we would have a great time together.
PROFESSOR EPSTEIN: Come to Chicago.
PROFESSOR KENNEDY: That is not what I had in mind.
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